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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the welfare effects of in-situ slum upgrading and relocation 
programs using data for 5,000 households in Mumbai, India. We estimate a model of 
residential location choice in which households value the ethnic composition of 
neighborhoods and employment accessibility in addition to housing characteristics. 
The importance of neighborhood composition and employment access implies that 
relocation programs must be designed carefully if they are to be welfare-enhancing.  The 
value of our model is that it allows us to determine the magnitude of these effects.  It also 
allows us to determine the value households place on in situ improvements, which 
policymakers need to know if they are to design housing programs that permit cost 
recovery. 
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Measuring the Welfare Effects of Slum Improvement Programs: 
The Case of Mumbai 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Slums, which are characterized by substandard housing and inadequate water and 
sanitation facilities, present some of the most pressing urban environmental problems in 
developing countries.  Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions increase the incidence of 
communicable diseases, such as diarrhea, worms, and tuberculosis, and make infant 
mortality rates in slums almost as high as in rural areas (Sclar, Gareau and Carolini [24]).  
This is due both to poor healthcare and unsanitary conditions:  water quality in slums is 
poor and community toilets often overflow with human waste.   
In the early Twentieth Century, slum improvement programs in many countries 
were equivalent to slum clearance—hardly a solution to the problem of lack of adequate 
housing in developing country cities.  Beginning in the 1970’s the strategy shifted to one 
of improving and consolidating existing housing—often by providing slum dwellers 
tenure security, combined with the materials needed to upgrade their housing or—in 
areas where land was plentiful—to build new housing.  Emphasis on in situ 
improvements has continued to the present.  These improvements may take the form of 
providing infrastructure services and other forms of physical capital, but also include 
efforts to foster community management, and access to health care and education.  At the 
same time, some have called for replacing slums with multiple story housing either at the 
site of the original slum or in an alternate location. 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of such programs using 
data for Mumbai (Bombay), India.  A key issue in slum upgrading is whether current 
 3
residents are made better off by improving housing in situ, or by relocating.  The answer 
to this question depends on the tradeoffs people are willing to make taking account of 
commuting costs, housing costs and the attributes of the housing that they consume.  If, 
for example, a relocation program distances a worker from his job and, if finding a new 
job is difficult, in situ improvements in housing may dominate relocation programs.  The 
utility of relocation programs also depends on neighborhood composition:  if households 
depend on neighbors of the same caste or ethnic group for information about employment 
or for social services, relocation to neighborhoods of different ethnicity may be welfare-
reducing.  
Evaluating the welfare effects of slum upgrading and resettlement programs can 
be accomplished by estimating models of residential location choice, in which 
households trade off commuting costs against the cost and attributes of the housing they 
consume, including neighborhood attributes.  We estimate such a model using data for 
5,000 households in Mumbai, a city in which 40% of the population lives in slums.  A 
key feature of Mumbai that distinguishes it from other Third World cities is that many 
slums are centrally located, i.e., located near employment centers, rather than being 
relegated to the periphery of the city.  Slum relocation projects may therefore involve 
moving people to more remote locations.  We ask what corresponding improvements in 
housing and/or income would be necessary to offset the location change. 
To answer these questions we estimate a model of residential location choice for 
households in Mumbai.  The choice of residential location is modeled as a discrete choice 
problem in which each household’s choice set consists of the chosen house type plus a 
random sample of 99 houses from the subset of the 5,000 house types in our sample that 
the household can afford.  House types are described by a vector of housing 
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characteristics and by the characteristics of the neighborhood within a 1 km radius.  Two 
important neighborhood characteristics are ethnic composition (the percent of one’s 
neighbors of the same religion and same mother tongue) and employment accessibility.  
In one specification we treat the employment location of the primary household earner as 
fixed and characterize house types by their distance from the current work location.  In an 
alternate specification we replace distance to the current workplace by an employment 
accessibility index, to capture opportunities for changing jobs.   
We use the model of residential location to examine the welfare effects of specific 
programs—in situ improvements in housing attributes and the provision of basic public 
services, and a slum relocation program.  Historically, both types of programs have been 
implemented in Mumbai (Mukhija [21]; Mukhija [22]).  In 1985 the World Bank 
launched the Bombay Urban Development Project to provide tenure security and 
encourage in situ upgrading by slum dwellers.  In the same year the Prime Minister’s 
Grant Project (PMGP), introduced by the state of Maharashtra, proposed to construct new 
housing units on the sites of existing slums in Dharavi.  Currently the Valmiki Ambedkar 
Awas Tojana Program (VAMBAY) provides loans to the poor to build or upgrade 
houses.1 
The economics literature on the benefits of slum improvements has, for the most 
part, consisted of hedonic studies that estimate the market value of various 
improvements, including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. [10]; 
Jimenez [13]).  Kaufman and Quigley [14] advanced this literature by estimating the 
parameters of household utility functions rather than limiting the analysis to the hedonic 
price function.  We extend this literature in three ways:  first, following Bayer, McMillan 
                                                 
1 http://mhada.bom.nic.in/html/web_VAMBAY.htm.  Mukhija (2001) notes that there was little interest in 
the World Bank’s 1985 program, possibly due to competition from the Prime Minister’s Grant Project. 
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and Rueben [2,3] we introduce distance to work and neighborhood amenities—in 
particular the language and religion of one’s neighbors—as factors influencing the choice 
of residential location.  One advantage of the discrete choice approach over the hedonic 
approach to modeling residential location is that the former more easily incorporates 
characteristics that vary with the chooser, such as the distance to his workplace.  It also 
allows the value of neighborhood characteristics—for example, religion or language—to 
depend on household attributes:  A Hindu household may value living with Hindus more 
than living with Muslims.  Secondly, we account for unobserved heterogeneity in housing 
and neighborhood attributes, in the spirit of Bayer, McMillan and Rueben [3], by 
estimating housing-type constants for all housing types in the universal choice set.  
Failure to do so will bias the values attached to housing and neighborhood attributes.  
Thirdly, we extend Bayer, McMillan and Rueben [2,3] by computing exact welfare 
measures for changes in housing and neighborhood attributes.2   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data used in our 
empirical work and presents the stylized facts about where people live and work in 
Mumbai.  Section 3 describes the model of residential location choice.  Section 4 presents 
estimation results and section 5 the welfare effects of slum upgrading policies.  Section 6 
concludes. 
II. Job and Housing Locations in Mumbai 
 
The target population of our study are households in the Greater Mumbai Region 
(GMR), which constitutes the core of the Mumbai metropolitan area.  The GMR, with a 
population of 11.9 million people in 2001, is one of the most densely populated cities in 
                                                 
2 The purpose of Bayer et al.’s analysis is not to value specific policy measures but rather to uncover the 
importance of different factors in explaining neighborhood segregation. 
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the world.3  Located on the Arabian Sea, the GMR extends 42 km north to south and has 
a maximum width of 17 km.  The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai has divided 
the city into 6 zones (see Figure 1), each with distinctive characteristics.4  The southern 
tip of the city (zone 1) is the traditional city center.  Zone 3 is a newly developed 
commercial and employment center, and zones 4, 5 and 6, each served by a different 
railway line, constitute the suburban area.  In the remainder of this section we describe 
the distribution of population and jobs in the GMR, as well as the characteristics of the 
housing stock, based on a random sample of 5,000 households in Mumbai who were 
surveyed in the winter of 2003-2004 (Baker et al. [1]).5   
Table 1 presents our sample households, broken down by income category.  
Households earning 5,000 Rs. per month or less constitute the bottom quartile (26.5%) of 
our sample, households earning 5,000-7,500 Rs. per month the next quartile (27.7%), 
households earning 7,500-10,000 Rs. per month 22% of our sample, and households in 
the next two income categories 18% and 6% of our sample, respectively.6   
                                                 
3 The population density of Mumbai in 2006 was about 27,220 persons per km2. 
4 The shaded areas in Figures 1-3 represent parks and flood plains—portions of the city that are not 
inhabited. 
5 The sampling universe for the Mumbai survey was the Greater Mumbai Region (GMR).  All households 
in the city were part of the sampling universe with the exception of residents of military cantonments and 
institutional populations (e.g., prisons). The target sample size was 5,000 households.  Household listings 
from the March 2001 Census were used as a sampling frame.  To ensure that all parts of the city were 
covered by the sample, we chose sample fractions in each of 88 sections of the city in proportion to 
population. Within each section census enumeration blocks (CEBs) were randomly selected in proportion 
to population.  Approximately 1,000 CEBs were sampled, with (on average) 5 households chosen in each 
CEB.  The selection of the households to be interviewed within a CEB was determined by choosing an 
arbitrary starting point in the CEB and sampling every 10th household.  The respondent within each 
household was either the head of household or the head’s spouse.  Enumerators were instructed to alternate 
male and female respondents within an enumeration block to assure an equal number of male and female 
respondents. 
6 In PPP terms, 5,000 Rs. corresponds to $562 USD.  
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Almost 40% of our sample households live in slums, with the percent living in 
slums increasing as income falls.7  This number is consistent with the extent of slums in 
other cities (United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements [26]). According to the 
United Nations, 924 million people, or 31.6% of the world’s urban population, lived in 
slums in 2001.  Slums in Mumbai were formed by residents squatting on open land as the 
city developed.8  Slum residents do not possess a transferable title to their property; 
however, “notified” squatter settlements have been registered by the city, and slum 
dwellers in these settlements are unlikely to be evicted.9  Chawls, which house 
approximately 35% of sample households, are usually low-rise apartments with 
community toilets that, on average, have better amenities than slums.  The remaining 
25% of households live either in cooperative housing, which includes modern, high-rise 
apartments, in bungalows, or in employer-provided housing. 
Because slum upgrading is the focus of the paper, Table 2 presents the 
characteristics of our sample households who reside in slums.  The table confirms that 
slum households are quite heterogeneous.  Although 37% of slum households fall in 
lowest income category, 29% have incomes of 7,500 Rs. per month or more.  Similarly, 
although 60% of households have a main earner who is either a skilled or unskilled 
laborer, a significant fraction of households have a main earner who is a white-collar 
                                                 
7 Throughout this paper the term “slum” and “squatter settlement” are used interchangeably.  In the 
household survey 40% of residents live in squatter settlements.  Virtually all squatter settlements in 
Mumbai would be classified as slums.  
8 For example, Dharavi, the world’s largest slum, was originally a fishing village located on swamp land.  
Slums began forming there in the late 19th century when land was reclaimed for tanneries.  Once on the 
periphery of Mumbai, Dharavi is now centrally located (in zone 2).  
91.8 % of our sample households live in “non-notified” slums and 1.6 % in resettlement areas.  The average 
tenure of households in notified squatter settlements suggests that squatters are unlikely to be evicted:  81% 
of households have been living in current location for more than 10 years while corresponding figure for 
the formal housing sector is 74%. 
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worker and 17% of main earners have more than a high school education.  Thus, although 
a significant fraction of slum dwellers are poor, all are not.10 
A.  Distribution of Population and Housing 
The spatial distribution of sample households by housing type is shown in Figures 
2 and 3, where each dot represents 5 households, and is summarized in Table 3.  Slums 
are not evenly spread throughout the city: they constitute a higher-than-average fraction 
of the housing stock in zones 5 and 6 (79% and 47%, respectively), but less than 20% of 
the housing stock in zones 1 and 4.   Nonetheless, slum dwellers in Mumbai are 
considerably more integrated among non-slum dwellers than in other cities: 40% of slum-
dwellers live in central Mumbai (zones 1-3).11  In contrast, there are virtually no slums in 
central locations in Delhi or many cities in Latin America (United Nations Global Report 
on Human Settlements [26], Ingram and Carroll [12]).  In these cities, slums are typically 
located at the periphery:  as a consequence, slum dwellers may spend several hours 
commuting to work. 
Table 4 shows characteristics of the housing stock by housing type and zone.  It 
attests to the fact that slum dwellings are, on average, smaller than either chawls or 
cooperative housing, and less likely to have piped water connections or a kitchen inside 
the dwelling.  It is, however, the case that the quality of slum housing varies considerably 
by zone: whereas 61% of slum households have piped water in zone 2, only 19% of slum 
households have piped water in zone 4 (Baker et al. [1], Table 37). 
Two features of Tables 1 and 4 deserve comment.  Table 1 suggests that 
households in Mumbai are less mobile than households in the U.S.  This is true of most 
developing country cities and is due, in part, to a thin mortgage market.   In most 
                                                 
10 As a referee has noted, this heterogeneity is necessary if we are to identify our residential location model. 
11 This is also true of the poor v. the non-poor.  See Baker et al. [1] Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3. 
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developed countries, the ratio of outstanding mortgage loans to GDP is between 0.25 and 
0.60.  In India mortgages were 2.5% of GDP in 2001.12  Table 4 reveals the very small 
floor space enjoyed by households in Mumbai.  (The average floor space in Table 4 
corresponds to a room 16 feet by 16 feet.)  This is largely the result of building height 
restrictions which limit the amount of floor space constructed per unit of land (Bertaud 
[7]).   
B. Distribution of Jobs and Commuting Patterns 
 
Table 5, based on data for 6,371 workers in our sample households, shows where 
people living in each zone work.13   Fifty-seven percent of workers in our sample 
households work in zones 1-3, 31% in the suburbs (zones 4-6), and 6% at home.  The rest 
either do not work in a fixed location or work outside of the GMR.  A striking feature of 
Table 5 is the high percent of workers who live in the same zone in which they work.  
This is highest in zones 1-3, but is substantial even in the suburbs.  Replicating Table 5 
for different income and occupational groups reveals that the diagonal elements in the 
table (the percent of people working and living in the same zone) are higher for workers 
in low-income than in high-income households, and are higher for unskilled and skilled 
laborers than for professionals (Baker et al. [1], Tables 38 and D-1).   
Figure 4, which shows the distribution of one-way commute distances for workers 
in our sample is consistent with Table 5: the median journey to work is less than 3 
kilometers, although the distribution of commute distances has a long tail.  Table 6, 
which shows mean commute distance by zone and income, suggests that persons with 
longer commutes are more likely to live in the suburbs, especially in zones 4 and 6.  With 
                                                 
12 http://www.economywatch.com/mortgage/india.html 
13 Table 4 is based on the usual commutes of the two most important earners in each household.  Forty 
percent of sample households have more than one earner. 
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few exceptions, mean commute to work increases with income, regardless of zone of 
residence.   
The information presented here suggests that, on average, people in Mumbai live 
close to where they work:  This is especially true for the poor, and also for laborers.  This 
suggests that households may place a high premium on short commutes.14  If, in the short 
run, workers’ job locations are fixed, slum upgrading programs that require households to 
move may reduce welfare if they move workers farther from their jobs.  The impact of 
such programs on welfare will, however, also depend on the value attached to housing 
and neighborhood amenities. 
 
III. Analytical Framework 
 
The models of residential location choice we have estimated are descendants of 
discrete location choice models (e.g., McFadden [17]), but incorporate the recent 
literature on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in discrete location choice models 
(Bayer, McMillan and Rueben [3]).  This section describes in detail the structure of these 
models and how they will be used to evaluate slum improvement programs.   
A.  Modeling Location Choice 
 
We characterize housing types in Mumbai by a vector  Xh   of house 
characteristics, by the religion and language of the neighborhood in which the house is 
located and by an index of employment accessibility.15   We assume that the utility that 
household  i  receives from house type  h  depends on Xh  and on the interaction of the 
household’s religion (language) and that of the neighborhood.  Formally, let Zri = 1 if 
household i is of the religion r and = 0 otherwise.  Rrh, is a 1 x J vector of dummy 
                                                 
14 A similar result is reported by Mohan [20] in his study of Bogota and Cali, Colombia: the average 
commute distance of workers in Bogota in 1978 is approximately 4 km. 
15 Formally, we assume that the house inhabited by each household in our sample represents a housing 
type, and that there are many houses of the same type in Mumbai.  Given the size of our sample (5,000 
households) relative to the number of households in Mumbai (over 3 million), this is a reasonable 
assumption. 
 11
variables describing the distribution of religion r in the neighborhood in which h is 
located.  (For example, Rr1h equals 1 if <1% of the neighborhood is of religion r, Rr2h 
equals 1  if 1-5% of the neighborhood is of religion r and so forth.)  Household i’s utility 
depends on the interaction of its religion with the elements of  Rrh and likewise for 
language (Llh).  Utility also depends on the employment accessibility of the principal 
earner in the household, Eih, and on expenditure on all other goods, i.e., on income  yi  
minus the user cost of housing, ph.  Formally,  
 
hihhiphiEljhli
j
j
l
rjhri
j
j
r
hi pyELZRZU εξββγα ++−++++= ∑∑∑∑ )ln(hX Xβ     (1) 
  
 
In (1)  ξh  is a house specific constant that captures unobserved house and neighborhood 
characteristics that are perceived identically by all households;  εih  captures unobserved 
housing characteristics as perceived by household  i.  The terms in the first double 
summation are all zero except for the percent of the neighborhood that is of same religion 
as the household.  Our specification—i.e., the fact that α varies only with j and not r—
assumes that Muslims receive the same utility from having >75% of the neighborhood 
Muslim as Hindus do from having >75% of the neighborhood Hindu. 
Estimation of the parameters of (1) will allow us to infer the rate of substitution 
between accessibility to work and housing cost, and accessibility to work and 
neighborhood and housing characteristics.  To evaluate the welfare effect of moving 
household  i  from its chosen location to a new one, we compute the amount, CV, that 
must be subtracted from the Hicksian bundle to keep the systematic part of the 
household’s utility constant when it is moved. 
C. Estimation of the Model 
 
In estimating the model of residential location choice each household’s choice set 
Ci consists of the chosen house type plus a random sample of 99 house types from the 
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subset of the 4,023 house types in our sample that the household can afford.16  Estimation 
of the parameters of (1) follows the two-step approach outlined in Bayer, McMillan and 
Rueben [3].  For purposes of estimation it is convenient to rewrite equation (1) as  
 
)2()()ln( ihihhihhiphiEEljhli
j
j
l
rjhri
j
j
r
hhi pyELZRZU εθμδεββγαδ ++≡+−++++= ∑∑∑∑
 
where    hh ξδ +≡ hX Xβ   is the housing-type-specific constant attached to housing type h. 
In the first step we estimate the parameters in (2)—the set of house-type specific 
constants {δh}  and θ the vector of parameters ({αj}, {γj}, βE and βp) on variables that 
vary by both household and house type.  In the second stage we regress δh on Xh to 
estimate the parameter vector βX.   
In stage one of the estimation the probability that household i purchases house 
type h is given by 
∑
∈
+
+=
iCm
imm
ihh
ihP
)](exp[
)](exp[
θμδ
θμδ               (3) 
We find the vector  θ  that maximizes the likelihood function for a given value of  {δh}  
and calculate the estimated demand for each house  h  as  
∑=
i
ihh PD . 
Then  we search for the set of  {δh}  that satisfy the maximization condition in equation 
(4), given our estimate of  θ,  
01)1(/ln =−=+−=∂∂ ∑∑
≠ i
ih
hi
ihhhh PPPL δ , h∀ .     (4) 
                                                 
16 The original set of approximately 5,000 households is reduced because information about housing 
characteristics is missing for some houses, and because we eliminate employed-provided housing from the 
choice set.  A house is affordable to household  i  if its monthly cost does not exceed household i’s income. 
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Berry [5] and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [6] show that for any  θ  the unique {δh}  that 
satisfy above conditions can be obtained by solving the contraction mapping 
)ln(1 ∑−=+
i
ih
t
h
t
h Pδδ .        (5) 
where  t  indexes the t-th iteration of the estimation. The  {δh}  thus obtained are used to 
re-estimate  θ.  The procedure is iterated until our estimators converge.   
In the second step of the estimation δh  is regressed on  Xh  to determine the 
coefficient vector  βX.  When Bayer et al. [3] estimate discrete models of residential 
location choice they instrument for house price and also for neighborhood characteristics 
in the second stage of the estimation.  We do not need to do this.  House price enters our 
model as the log of the Hicksian bundle, ln(yi-ph), hence we are able to estimate its 
coefficient in the first stage of the analysis while controlling for the housing-type specific 
constants.  The same is true of neighborhood characteristics.  Our neighborhood 
characteristics—the language and religion of the neighborhood—enter the utility function 
multiplied by dummies for the household’s own language and religion, so that these 
coefficients can also be estimated in the first stage.  
IV.       Estimation Results 
A. Specification of the Utility Function 
We assume that a household’s utility from its residential location [eq. (1)] 
depends on housing and neighborhood characteristics.  The first ten variables in Table 7 
describe the house itself: whether the dwelling is a slum or a cooperative (chawl is the 
omitted category), whether it is a multi-story dwelling (flat), dummy variables to indicate 
the quality of the floor and roof, and the interior space in square feet.  This is followed by 
a series of dummy variables indicating whether the house has a kitchen, a toilet, or a 
bathroom (i.e., a room for washing), and whether there is a piped water connection in the 
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house.  Due to the high correlation among these housing characteristics we replace them 
in empirical work by their first two principal components, which have eigenvalues 
greater than one.17  We also characterize the house type in terms of distance from the 
nearest railroad track (whether it is < 300m from a track) and by the zone in which it is 
located.18   
Neighborhood characteristics include religion and mother tongue.  Specifically, 
we assume that utility is a function of the percent of households in the neighborhood that 
(a) are of the same religion as the household in question and (b) who speak the same 
mother tongue.19  These variables should capture network externalities and other forms of 
social capital provided by neighbors of the same ethnic background.  Table 7 indicates 
the degree of ethnic sorting in Mumbai:  For example, while Muslim households 
comprise only 17% of the city’s population, the average Muslin household in our sample 
lives in a neighborhood that is 35% Muslim.  Although people from the state of Gujarat 
constitute only 12% of the population of Mumbai, the average household from Gujarat in 
our sample lives in a neighborhood that is 26% Gujarati.  The extent of ethnic sorting is 
greater, in relative terms, for minority groups—e.g., for Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, 
Tamils and Telugus—than for households in the majority (i.e., Hindus or households that 
speak Marathi or Hindi).  For this reason, we allow the coefficient on ethnic composition 
to vary with the percent of one’s neighbors from the same background.   
Employment access (Eih) for the principal wage earner in the household is 
computed as follows.  In Model 1, access is measured by the distance from the location of 
                                                 
17 The first two principal components explain approximately 60% of the variance in housing attributes.  
18 The results in Tables 8 and 10 change little if zone dummies are replaced by section dummies.  (There 
are 88 sections in Mumbai.)  We report results using zone dummies for ease of interpretation. 
19  Neighborhood characteristics are computed using sample households within 1 km of each house. A 
neighborhood contains, on average, 67 sample households, although the number varies depending on the 
population density of the area. 
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house type  h  to the worker’s current job location.20  The weight attached to distance 
from the current job location should capture the disutility of relocating in the short run, 
before the worker can change jobs.  In Model 2, we replace distance to the current job 
from house type h  by the average distance from h  to  the 100 nearest jobs in the 
worker’s occupation, based on our survey data.  We distinguish five occupations in 
computing the employment accessibility index: unskilled workers, skilled workers, sales 
and clerical workers, small business owners, and managers/professionals.  This variable 
should capture the disutility of being moved away from desirable employment locations, 
even if the worker can change jobs.  
Utility also depends on the log of monthly household income minus the cost of 
housing (i.e., the log of the Hicksian bundle).  The Hicksian bundle is calculated as 
follows.  All sample households were asked what “a dwelling like theirs” would rent for 
and what it would sell for.21  We use the stated monthly market rent as the cost of the 
dwelling.  In calculating the income of households who currently own their home, we add 
to household income from earnings and other sources the monthly rent associated with 
the dwelling they own.  For renters, household income is stated income from earnings 
and other sources.22   The mean value of the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the current 
residence, is 8,275 Rs.  The median Hicksian bundle approximately 6,250 Rs. per month.  
                                                 
20 The distance from house type h to a worker’s job is estimated as the distance between h (whose location 
is geo-reference in the survey) and the approximate work location.  The work location is approximated by 
the centroid of the intersection of the section and pin code in which the job is located.  
21 It should also be noted that all households, including those in slums, reported a positive answer to this 
question.  (The mean reported rent for slum dwellers is Rs. 1065.) We have used the answers to these 
questions to compute for each household the interest rate that would equate the purchase price of the house 
to the discounted present value of rental payments.  The mean interest rate is 5.6% and the median 4.8%. 
Additional evidence that stated market rents are reliable is provided by using them to estimate an hedonic 
price function for housing in Mumbai.  The housing and neighborhood characteristics in Table 7, together 
with distance to the CBD, explain 64% of the variation in monthly rents in our sample.  (See Table A1.)   
22 Seventy-four percent of sample households claim to own their own home, whereas 26% indicate that 
they rent.  Surprisingly, 83% of households living in notified squatter settlements claim to own their own 
homes, although it is unlikely that they possess a transferable title. 
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B. Results 
Table 8 presents the results of estimating our models.  The top of the first column 
of the table presents estimates of the parameter vector  θ, which contains the coefficients 
of all variables that vary by household as well as by house type and  is estimated in the 
first stage of the estimation procedure together with the set of house-specific constants  
{δh}.  In the second stage, the  {δh}  are regressed on the principal components of housing 
characteristics, as well as the zone dummies and whether h is within 300 m of a railroad 
track.  The coefficients from stage two are presented at the bottom of the first column.   
The second column of the table presents the coefficients of the individual housing 
attributes, as well as the marginal value of each amenity, i.e., the marginal rate of 
substitution between the amenity and the Hicksian bundle, evaluated at the median 
household income for our sample (6,250 Rs. per month).23  The coefficients of the k 
individual housing attributes are derived from the first two principal components as 
follows.  Let A be a k x p (p=2) matrix whose columns contain coefficients of the 2 
principal components used in our analysis.  Let βp be a p x 1 vector of coefficients on the 
principal components estimated during stage 2 of the estimation procedure and βx be a k x 
1 vector of coefficients on the original k housing characteristics in the utility function. 
We solve for βx using βx= Aβp. 
In both specifications all housing attributes are statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Other things equal, being in a chawl (the omitted housing category) is worth about 
400 Rs. per month more than being in a slum, whereas being in a coop is worth about 700 
Rs. more than being in a chawl.  Being in a high-rise building (flat) is worth about 730 
Rs. per month.  The mean value of a piped water connection is about 240 Rs. per month, 
                                                 
23 The marginal rate of substitution between (e.g.) Eih and the Hicksian bundle is given by βE(yi-ph)/βH. 
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and mean willingness to pay for a private toilet about 580 Rs. per month.  Overall, the 
value attached to housing attributes seems reasonable, with the exception of “good floor.”   
Workers in Mumbai place a premium on living close to where they work.  Model 
1 suggests that a household with income of 6,250 Rs. per month would give up about 330 
Rs. to decrease the main earner’s one-way commute by 1 km.24  In Model 2, the value of 
a one km decrease in the average distance to the 100 nearest jobs in one’s occupation is 
283 Rs. 
Neighborhood attributes matter.  The value of being with households who speak 
the same mother tongue and have the same religion depends on whether one is in the 
minority or the majority.  In a neighborhood where only 5-10% of one’s neighbors speak 
the same mother tongue, the value of a one percentage point increase in mother tongue is 
large (162 Rs.).  [All values refer to model 1.]  In a neighborhood where 50-75% of one’s 
neighbors speak the same mother tongue, the value of a one percentage point increase is 
only 15 Rs.  Similar results hold for living with members of the same religion: a one 
percentage point increase in the percent of households of the same religion is worth 178 
Rs. evaluated at a baseline of 5-10% but is worth only 13 Rs. in a neighborhood where 
50-75% of households are already of the same religion. 
These values are large, and may reflect various forms of network externalities.  
Munshi and Rosenzweig [23] emphasize the importance of networks, formed along caste 
lines, in determining the jobs available to workers in Mumbai.  These networks are 
especially important for laborers and unskilled workers.  Similarly, in the United States, 
                                                 
24 Takeuchi, Cropper and Bento [25] estimate a commute mode choice model in which the mean value of 
out-of-vehicle travel time is between 35 and 40 Rs. per hour.  At a walking speed of 4 km per hour, this 
implies that the value of reducing one’s commute by 2 km (roundtrip) per day would be between 385 and 
440 Rs. per month, assuming 22 work trips.  When the distance of the second main earner’s commute is 
included in the model, the value of a one km decrease in the second earner’s commute is about 300 Rs. per 
month. 
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Bayer, Ross and Topa [4] find significant evidence of informal hiring networks, based on 
the fact that individuals residing in the same block group are more likely to work together 
than those in nearby but not identical blocks.   
In addition to providing employment networks, neighborhoods also serve as 
social capital to mitigate the effects of poverty.  For example, social networks make 
possible the creation of spontaneous mechanisms of informal insurance and can improve 
the efficiency of public service delivery and/or of public social protection systems 
(Collier [9]). 
We should, however, be cautious in interpreting these effects. In reality it is 
virtually impossible to disentangle the different reasons why similar individuals live in 
the same neighborhood.25  Part of this sorting is indeed due to preferences.  However, 
neighborhood composition could also be a result of imperfections in housing markets that 
segregate individuals to specific neighborhoods. 
Other amenities that affect residential location are proximity to a railroad track as 
well as the zone dummies.  Living next to a railroad track can be dangerous, in addition 
to providing visual disamenities:  Approximately 6 people are killed each day crossing 
railroad tracks in Mumbai.  The impact of zone dummies varies with the measure of 
employment access.   
V.     Evaluating Slum Improvement Programs 
The set of policies that have been employed to improve the welfare of slum 
dwellers is diverse (Field and Kremer [11]; Mukhija [21)).  Some projects have focused 
on providing secure tenure, on the grounds that this will provide an incentive for slum 
                                                 
25 Ethnic sorting does not appear to reflect the fact that people of the same religion or mother tongue have 
common educations and incomes.  When we attempt to use income and education to explain variation in 
the exposure of households in minority groups to members of their group, F statistics are rarely significant. 
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dwellers to invest in housing (Jimenez [13]; Malpezzi and Mayo [18]).  Other projects, 
such as those implemented under the World Bank’s Sites-and-Services program 
(Kaufmann and Quigley [14; Buckley and Kalarickel [8]) have combined secure tenure 
with provision of basic infrastructure services (piped water and electricity) and loans to 
allow slum dwellers to themselves build/upgrade their housing.26  More recently, greater 
emphasis has been placed on providing incentives for community management and 
maintenance, including constructing or rehabilitating community centers, and on 
improving access to health care and education.   
In this paper, we focus on improving the physical aspect of slums by providing 
infrastructure services and improving housing quality.  In Mumbai, virtually all slum 
dwellers have access to electricity; however, only half have piped water.  Slum housing 
consists of small, dilapidated shacks with poor roofs.  Programs to improve the physical 
quality of housing could involve in situ improvements or could involve housing 
reconstruction, either at the site of the original slum or in a location where bare land is 
available.   
We evaluate stylized versions of both types of programs—in situ upgrading and 
relocation of slum households to better housing.  We focus on slum households located in 
zone 5, specifically households in sections 79 and 80 who are located within one mile of 
the Harbor Railway.  The characteristics of our sample households living in these slums 
appear in Table 9.  These households are, on average, much poorer than our sample as 
whole, although 85% claim to own their own home.  Average house size is small—141 
sq. ft. in section 79 and 162 sq. ft. in section 80.  Almost no houses have good roofs and 
                                                 
26 In the World Bank sites-and-services project in El Salvador evaluated by Kaufman and Quigley [14], 
slum dwellers were given financing to purchase lots on which infrastructure services were provided, as well 
as materials to construct new homes.  Imperfections in credit markets and in the provision of infrastructure 
services are major reasons for initiating slum improvement projects.   
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only one quarter have piped water connections.  The primary earner in households in both 
sections commutes, on average, 5 km to work (one-way), although the variance in 
commute distance is large.  In terms of language and religion, the majority of households 
in section 79 are Marathi-speaking Hindus.  In section 80, the majority of households 
speak Hindi; sixty percent are Hindus and one-third are Muslims. 
The in situ program provides good roofs and piped water connections for 
households that do not have them.  The relocation program moves households from their 
current locations to new housing in Mankurd, a neighborhood in zone 5 where some 
households displaced by transportation improvement programs have been relocated.27  
(The original locations of households and the relocation site are shown in Figure 5.)  We 
assume that households are moved into good quality, low-rise buildings with piped water 
but with community toilets.  We assume in the short run that workers in resettled 
households continue to work in their old job locations.  The religious makeup of the new 
neighborhood is approximately half Hindu and half Muslim.  Sixty percent of households 
speak Hindi and one-third speak Marathi.   
To compute the welfare effects of each program, we calculate for each household 
the amount of money that can taken away from the household, in exchange for the vector 
of program attributes, to keep the systematic portion of the household’s utility constant.  
Compensating variation (CV) is implicitly defined as: 
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27 The second Mumbai Urban Transportation Program (MUTPII) will involve resettling 20,000 households 
located on railway rights-of-way. 
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where  0’s  denote housing and neighborhood attributes originally consumed and  1’s  
denote attributes consumed with the program.  Welfare effects from the relocation 
program are computed assuming that households pay the same amount for their housing 
with and without the program.  CV should therefore be interpreted as the monetary value 
of the benefits of the program over and above current housing costs.  Welfare effects 
from the relocation program are computed holding current job location fixed, to capture 
the short-run effects of the program and replacing current job location by the employment 
access index, to capture opportunities for workers to change jobs.   
Table 10 reports the mean welfare effects of the in situ upgrading program and the 
relocation program under alternate assumptions about workplace location.  The 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentile of CV values for the households in Table 9 are also presented in the 
table.  The in situ upgrading program is worth, on average, approximately 500 Rs. per 
month, or about 10% of household income.  The range of CV values for the programs 
reflects the range of incomes of the affected households.  The mean benefit of the 
relocation program differs substantially between households who originally lived in 
section 79 and those who lived in section 80 and depends crucially on employment and 
neighborhood effects:  Households originally residing in section 80 are, on average, 
better off under the relocation program than under in situ upgrading; the reverse holds for 
households from section 79.   
To better understand the impacts of relocating, Table 10 presents the mean effects 
of different components of the slum upgrading program.  For example, the mean benefit 
of the housing improvement associated with the program is 813 Rs. per month for 
households from section 79 (Distance to work model).  Holding workplace location fixed, 
the mean disbenefit of being moved farther from the workplace is 290 Rs. per month, and 
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the mean disbenefit of changing neighborhood composition 490 Rs. per month.28  
Although the relocation program yields approximately equal housing benefits to both 
groups, and moves households away from railroad tracks, workers from section 79 are 
being moved much farther from their jobs than workers who originally lived in section 
80.  (The latter, on average, actually benefit by being moved closer to their jobs.)  The 
other major difference in welfare between the two groups comes from neighborhood 
effects.  Households who originally lived in section 79, who are primarily Marathi-
speaking Hindus, are being moved into a neighborhood with a greater proportion of 
Muslim and Hindi-speaking households.  They lose, on average, from the change in 
neighborhood composition.  For households from section 79, the disbenefits of changes 
in commute distance and neighborhood composition actually wipe out the housing 
benefits of the slum improvement program, a result consistent with Lall et al. [16]. 
The impact of the relocation program however depends on the assumptions made 
about workplace location.  When workplace location is held fixed, the households from 
section 79, who are on average being moved farther away from their jobs, are worse off 
than if they are able to change jobs:  average welfare losses due to a longer commute go 
down when distance to work is replaced by the employment accessibility index (job 
access model).  In the particular example illustrated in Table 10, however, the welfare 
impact of allowing workers to change jobs is not large in quantitative terms.  This is 
because the site of improved housing is not far away from section 79. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate more clearly the impact of changes in neighborhood 
composition and employment access on the benefits of slum improvement programs.  
The figures plot the median CV associated with our sample improvement program, for all 
                                                 
28 The sum of the mean compensating variations for each component of the program will not add to the 
mean CV for the program as a whole because the Hicksian bundle enters the utility function non-linearly. 
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beneficiaries in Table 9, as the location of the improved housing is moved to different 
places in the city.  In Figure 7 we assume that the primary worker in the household 
maintains his current place of employment when the household relocates; in Figure 6 we 
measure employment opportunities by the primary worker’s employment index.  In both 
figures, lighter areas indicate locations that are welfare-reducing; darker areas indicate 
moves that are, on average, welfare-enhancing.  (In both figures, neighborhood 
composition changes ipso facto with location.)   
When each worker’s job location is held fixed (Figure 7), the set of locations for 
the program that yield positive benefits (positive mean CV) is small indeed.  This has two 
important implications.  It suggests that, in the short run, the net benefits of involuntary 
resettlement programs—even those that improve housing quality—could well be negative 
and might need to be accompanied by cash transfers if they are not to reduce welfare.  
The second implication is that if potential participants in voluntary slum relocation 
programs look only at these programs from a short-run perspective (i.e., assuming that 
they cannot or will not change jobs), participation is likely to be low. 
The set of locations yielding positive benefits is much larger in Figure 6, in which 
household utility depends on the employment access index. A word of caution is, 
however, in order.  The employment access index does not capture spatial variation in 
wages, only variation in proximity of jobs.  The welfare measures in Figure 6 thus 
assume that earnings do not vary spatially.  To account for spatial variation in wages we 
estimated hedonic wage equations for the five occupational groups for which the 
employment access index is computed.  The average monthly wage for an unskilled male 
worker, who is married, 36 years old, has a high school degree is approximately 3600 Rs. 
in zone 5.  It is significantly lower than this only in zone 3, where it is 3000 Rs. per 
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month.  This suggests that the welfare gains from a program relocating households to 
sections 40-57 are likely overstated.  The general point made by comparing Figures 6 and 
7 is, however, clear: if workers can change jobs, the welfare improvements of relocation 
programs are greater, and the set of welfare-enhancing sites increases.    
VI.  Conclusions 
In order to design successful slum improvement programs, it is important to 
determine whether program benefits exceed program costs.  It is also important, from the 
perspective of cost recovery, to determine household willingness to pay for specific 
program options.  The early literature (Mayo and Gross [19]) focused on estimating the 
percent of income households were willing to spend on housing.  This was followed by a 
literature that attempted to measure, using hedonic price functions, the market value of 
various improvements, including tenure security and infrastructure services (Crane et al. 
[10]; Jimenez [13]).  It is, however, difficult using the hedonic approach to value 
attributes that vary by household, such as distance to work, or the percent of neighbors 
similar to oneself.  We believe that both sets of attributes are important in valuing slum 
improvement programs and have attempted to extend the literature by illustrating the 
value placed on these amenities by households in Mumbai.   
We believe that the model estimated in this paper can be of use in calculating the 
relative welfare gains from alternative slum improvement programs.29  It is also useful in 
predicting which households would be likely to participate in various programs, given 
costs of participation.  In assessing the limited success of sites-and-services programs, 
Mayo and Gross [19] cite the failure of many programs to choose the right package of 
services to promote cost-recovery, a result echoed by Buckley and Kalarickal [10].  
                                                 
29Unfortunately, comparing benefits with program costs is outside the scope of this paper.   
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Location is an important component of the design of a slum improvement program.  One 
contribution of this paper is to quantify, for the case of Mumbai, the quantitative 
importance of location versus other program characteristics.  Another is to reinforce the 
results of other authors (Lall et al. [16]) who suggest that in situ improvements are, in 
many cases, likely to dominate programs to relocate slum dwellers.
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Table 1.  Selected Household Characteristics in Mumbai, by Income Group 
 Income Group (in rupees per month) 
Characteristic < 5 k 5–7.5k 7.5–10k 10–20 k >20 k All HHs 
Household size (mean) 4 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 
Age of Head (mean) 38.2 39.4 41.1 42.9 45 40.4 
Female Head (%) 8.8 3 3.9 3.2 1.3 4.5 
Education (%)       
  Primary or less 20.6  10.8  7.2  2.0  0.3  10.4  
  College or above 4.0  7.9  17.0  39.2  66.5  18.0  
Occupation (%)       
 Unskilled 33.9  21.0  11.1  3.5  1.3  17.9  
Housing Category (%)       
  Squatter settlement 52.2 45.3 34.3 16.1 6.2 37.2 
  Chawls 37.5 37.5 41.5 27.6 9.9 34.9 
  Cooperative Housing 5.2 9.6 17.1 47.6 78 21 
  Other 5.1 7.7 7.2 8.8 5.9 7.1 
Housing Tenure (%)       
  Less than 5 years 18.6 14.5 13.2 20.1 17.4 16.4 
  6-9 years 8.2 7.5 7.1 8.5 10.8 8 
  More than 10 years 34.5 35.3 34.7 31.3 46.6 35 
  Since birth 38.7 42.7 45 40.1 25.3 40.6 
Within-household access to 
(%): 
      
   Piped Water 48 64 75 92 99 69 
   Toilet 12 18 31 64 89 32 
   Kitchen 29 43 61 87 98 54 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Slum Households 
  % 
Income Category   
 <5k 36.9 
 5k-7.5k 34.4 
 7.5k-10k 20.2 
 10k-20k 7.6 
 >20k 0.9 
Main Earner's Occupation   
 Unskilled worker 25.7 
 Skilled worker 34.2 
 Petty trader 7.7 
 Shop owner 8.9 
 Businessman with no employees 3.0 
 Businessman with 1-9 employees 1.5 
 Businessman with 10+ employees 0.2 
 Self employed professional 0.4 
 Clerical/Salesman 11.3 
 Supervisor 2.5 
 Officer/Junior executive 1.4 
 Officer/Middle/Senior executive 0.8 
 Housewife 0.3 
 Not working 1.7 
 Other 0.5 
Main Earner's Education   
 <Primary 8.1 
 Primary 6.9 
 Middle school 31.9 
 High school 36.4 
 12th grade/Technical training 10.7 
 College 5.0 
 Post graduate 1.0 
Female Headed Households 5.0 
 
 
Table 3.  Percent of Households in Different Types of Housing by Zone  
Zone       
1 2 3 4 5 6 Average 
Slum 19.2  36.8  35.1  16.9  78.9  47.3  38.7  
Chawl/Wadi 52.0  39.9  37.5  50.2  7.3  24.0  35.2  
Coop/Employer-Provided Housing 28.7  23.3  27.4  32.9  13.8  28.7  26.1  
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Table 4.  Housing Characteristics by Housing Type 
  Slum Chawl Coop/ Employer Provided All Types 
Kitchen in the unit 37% 45% 92% 54% 
Toilet in the unit 5% 21% 86% 32% 
Bathroom in the unit 39% 60% 95% 61% 
Water in the unit 50% 69% 98% 69% 
Size (sqft) 172 226 428 258 
 
 
 
Table 5. Percentage Distribution of Workers Across Job Locations, by Zone of 
Residence 
  Work location               
Home At home Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5 Zone 6 Outside  of GMR  Not fixed
Zone 1 8.5  76.0  5.4  4.1  0.9  1.1  2.9  1.2  0.1  
Zone 2 6.2  20.3  60.4  6.1  1.6  1.5  1.0  2.8  0.0  
Zone 3 5.0  6.7  5.0  73.1  4.2  2.0  0.7  0.3  3.0  
Zone 4 8.8  10.2  4.3  21.2  47.8  0.5  0.8  3.1  3.2  
Zone 5 2.1  9.0  7.8  6.7  0.9  54.6  6.7  4.7  7.7  
Zone 6 4.4  13.3  8.1  7.7  15.1  3.6  37.6  5.4  4.9  
Average 5.8  19.5  15.1  22.3  13.4  9.3  8.5  2.9  3.2  
  
 
Table 6.  Mean Commute Distance by Zone and Income (km) 
Zone <5k 5k-7.5k 7.5k-10k 10k-20k >20k All HHs 
1 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.3 
2 2.8 3.5 4.4 4.5 5.7 4.0 
3 2.8 3.5 4.7 5.1 5.0 4.1 
4 4.8 6.7 6.3 9.5 11.3 7.1 
5 3.7 4.5 5.8 4.5 6.0 4.6 
6 6.2 7.7 8.8 8.9 10.4 8.0 
Average 3.9 4.9 5.7 6.1 7.7 5.3 
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Table 7.  Summary Statistics of Variables in Location Choice Model
Mean Sd. Dev Distribution in population
Slum 0.39 -
Coop 0.22 -
Flat 0.20 -
Good floor 0.81 -
Good roof 0.42 -
House size (sqft) 252 174
Kitchen in house 0.53 -
Toilet in house 0.30 -
Bathroom in house 0.61 -
Water in house 0.69 -
<300m to rail track 0.20 -
Zone2 0.17 -
Zone3 0.24 -
Zone4 0.23 -
Zone5 0.13 -
Zone6 0.12 -
Neighbor with same religion*
Hindu 79% 0.15 74%
Muslim 34% 0.19 17%
Christian 8% 0.07 4%
Sikh 4% 0.03 0%
Buddhist 10% 0.06 3%
Jain 4% 0.03 1%
Neighbor with same language
Marathi 55% 0.17 48%
Hindi 33% 0.17 24%
Konkani 4% 0.04 2%
Gujarati 26% 0.14 12%
Marwari 5% 0.05 2%
Punjabi 4% 0.04 1%
Sindhi 4% 0.06 0%
Kannada 2% 0.02 1%
Tamil 4% 0.04 2%
Telugu 5% 0.07 1%
English 7% 0.06 1%
1st earner commute distance (km) 5.5 7.3
Job access index for main eaner 2.39 1.16
Hicksian bundle (Rs. /month) 8275 7217
*First column: For Hindu households in the sample, the average % of Hindus in the 
neighborhood
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Table 8. Estimation Results for Model of Location Choice
Implied coefficients on original variables:
First Stage Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
ln(Hicksian bundle) 5.12 5.06 Slum -0.34 -0.33
[54.33]** [54.61]** [53.00]** [54.68]**
Main earner commute*** -0.27 -0.23 Coop 0.58 0.56
[72.30]** [14.43]** [43.99]** [45.46]**
Same religion(<1%) 65.62 81.41 Flat 0.60 0.59
[2.71]** [3.45]** [40.74]** [42.14]**
Same religion(1-5%) 20.07 19.60 Good floor -0.05 -0.06
[3.03]** [3.08]** [2.12]** [2.50]**
Same religion(5-10%) 14.59 15.01 Good roof 0.39 0.38
[3.99]** [4.24]** [53.09]** [54.77]**
Same religion(10-25%) 1.05 1.82 Size 0.28 0.27
[1.16] [2.08]* [53.65]** [54.94]**
Same religion(25-50%) 3.11 3.03 Kitchen 0.20 0.19
[6.79]** [6.91]** [18.83]** [19.04]**
Same religion(50-75%) 1.03 1.13 Toilet 0.48 0.46
[3.31]** [3.74]** [57.78]** [59.57]**
Same religion(>75%) 3.46 2.53 Bathroom 0.21 0.20
[11.10]** [9.02]** [19.73]** [19.97]**
Same language(<1%) 102.62 102.19 Water 0.20 0.19
[6.38]** [6.54]** [22.47]** [22.79]**
Same language(1-5%) 11.07 15.31
[2.29]* [3.29]** WTP (at HH Income of Rs.6250 /month)
Same language(5-10%) 13.25 12.02 Model 1 Model 2
[4.35]** [4.07]** Main earner commute -329 -283
Same language(10-25%) 4.31 5.14 Same religion(<1%) 801 1006
[6.40]** [7.94]** Same religion(1-5%) 245 242
Same language(25-50%) 2.29 2.39 Same religion(5-10%) 178 185
[7.84]** [8.43]** Same religion(10-25%) 13 22
Same language(50-75%) 1.24 1.06 Same religion(25-50%) 38 37
[3.99]** [3.55]** Same religion(50-75%) 13 14
Same language(>75%) -1.08 -0.11 Same religion(>75%) 42 31
[1.31] [0.13] Same language(<1%) 1252 1262
Constant -1.09 0.31 Same language(1-5%) 135 189
[23.06]** [7.02]** Same language(5-10%) 162 148
Observations 4023 4023 Same language(10-25%) 53 63
Pseudo R-squared (1st stage) 0.39 0.24 Same language(25-50%) 28 30
LL -13787 -16225 Same language(50-75%) 15 13
Second Stage Coefficients Same language(>75%) -13 -1
1st PC for house characteristics 0.50 0.49 Slum -411 -405
[69.24]** [71.12]** Coop 704 696
2nd PC for house characteristics -0.17 -0.17 Flat 734 726
[11.46]** [12.09]** Good floor -62 -70
zone==2 0.19 -0.37 Good roof 480 473
[3.22]** [6.51]** Size (at 200sqft) 1.7 1.7
zone==3 1.23 -0.30 Kitchen 243 235
[21.99]** [5.68]** Toilet 581 572
zone==4 1.90 -0.50 Bathroom 252 244
[33.82]** [9.48]** Water 246 239
zone==5 0.97 -0.41 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
[15.15]** [6.85]**
zone==6 1.74 -0.10
[26.77]** [1.61]
Within 0.3km from rail track -0.05 -0.06
[1.37] [1.70]
R-squared (2nd stage) 0.65 0.59
*** In the first column distance to current job and in the second 
column, average distance to nearest 100 jobs within main earner'
occupation category
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Table 9.  Summary Statistics of Households in Targeted Area  
  Current situation Upgrading 
  Section 79 Section 80 Relocation In-situ Improvement 
# in sample 80 42    
Hicksian bundle (Rs. /month) 5009  5993  Unchanged Unchanged 
Flat 0.00  0.00  NO Unchanged 
Good floor 0.75  0.45  YES Unchanged 
Good roof 0.05  0.00  YES YES 
House size (sqft) 141  162  165 Unchanged 
Kitchen 0.21  0.26  NO Unchanged 
Toilet 0.00  0.00  NO Unchanged 
Bathroom 0.10  0.07  NO Unchanged 
Water 0.26  0.24  YES YES 
1st earner commute distance (km) 5.0  4.9  5.7 Unchanged 
1st earner Job Access index 1.6  2.6  2.0  Unchanged 
<300m to rail track 0.58  0.40  NO Unchanged 
Neighbor with same religion        
Hindu 73% 61% 45% Unchanged 
Muslim 15% 31% 45% Unchanged 
Christian NA NA 1% Unchanged 
Sikh NA NA 0% Unchanged 
Buddhist 17% 12% 8% Unchanged 
Jain NA NA 0% Unchanged 
Neighbor with same language        
Marathi 61% 40% 34% Unchanged 
Hindi 19% 47% 60% Unchanged 
Konkani 1% NA 0% Unchanged 
Gujarati 1% NA 0% Unchanged 
Marwari 13% NA 0% Unchanged 
Punjabi NA NA 0% Unchanged 
Sindhi NA NA 0% Unchanged 
Kannada 0% 1% 0% Unchanged 
Tamil 8% NA 0% Unchanged 
Telugu NA NA 1% Unchanged 
English NA NA 1% Unchanged 
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Table 10. Effects of Slum Upgrading Programs 
  
Relocation Case     
(Dist to work 
model) 
Relocation Case     
(Job access model) 
In-situ 
Improvements 
Section 79 80 79 80 79 80 
Total Compensating Variation 
(Rs. /month)          
Mean -89  1194  216  1315  474  591  
Std Dev 1373  1595  1289  1697  326  377  
25% 355  1369  587  1581  672  672  
50% -107  731  73  929  269  630  
75% -646  394  -463  371  269  269  
Mean contribution*          
House 813  911  800  889     
Commute -290  87  -119  169     
Rail track 29  24  34  29     
Neighbor -490  416  -366  518      
* The sum of the mean compensating variations for each component of the program 
donot add to the mean CV for the program as a whole because the Hicksian bundle 
enters the utility function non-linearly. 
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Figure 4.  Sample Distribution for One-way Commute Distance 
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Figure 6.  CV for the Relocation Program Using Job Access Model 
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Figure 7 CV for the Relocation Program Using Distance to Work Model 
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Table A1 Hedonic Rent Function Estimates
Dependent var=ln(rent) 1 2
Slum -0.09 -0.09
[4.34]*** [4.36]***
Coop 0.29 0.28
[7.88]*** [7.78]***
flat 0.34 0.34
[9.28]*** [9.33]***
Good floor 0.06 0.06
[2.55]** [2.63]***
Good wall 0.35 0.36
[8.39]*** [8.44]***
Good roof 0.08 0.08
[3.56]*** [3.33]***
Size 0.40 0.40
[20.10]*** [20.18]***
Kitchen 0.06 0.07
[2.91]*** [3.29]***
Toilet 0.10 0.10
[3.80]*** [3.47]***
Bathroom 0.07 0.07
[3.19]*** [3.16]***
Water 0.05 0.04
[2.56]** [2.11]**
Near rail track -0.02 -0.03
[1.22] [1.45]
zone==2 -0.07 -0.08
[1.60] [1.78]*
zone==3 -0.13 -0.13
[2.02]** [2.07]**
zone==4 -0.22 -0.22
[2.79]*** [2.80]***
zone==5 -0.20 -0.20
[3.26]*** [3.22]***
zone==6 -0.25 -0.25
[3.42]*** [3.41]***
Neighbor's income 0.00004 0.00004
[11.12]*** [10.88]***
Ln(distnace to CBD) -0.09 -0.09
[2.83]*** [2.66]***
Near rail station 0.00
[0.10]
Near bus stop 0.14
[4.86]***
Vehicle accessible road 0.04
[1.80]*
Constant 4.56 4.38
[38.46]*** [35.53]***
Observations 4132 4132
Adjusted R-squared 0.639 0.641
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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